Belief functions and burdens of proof

Two recent attempts have been made to apply Glenn Shafer's theory of belief functions to the problem of understanding and articulating the various standards of persuasion encountered in common-law adjudication. Kevin Clermont builds Shafer's notion of ‘uncommitted support’ into the criminal standard, proof ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, but does not incorporate it into either of the usual civil standards, ‘preponderance of the evidence’ and ‘clear and convincing evidence’. In contrast, I have argued that uncommitted support does not matter to any of the standards of proof properly applied by the fact-finder, but it might figure into a separate determination, namely, whether the ‘weight’ of the evidence (in Keynes's sense of that term) has been practically optimized as a condition on submitting the matter to the fact-finder for decision, a determination that pertains to both criminal and civil cases. The latter view is defended.