Analysis of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) with Improvement in Byzantine Robustness

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the default interdomain routing protocol. However, BGP suffers from many security vulnerabilities such as Byzantine failure. In case of Byzantine failure, a well-defined legitimate node with valid prefix does not behave legitimately and such misbehavior is named as Byzantine failure. The validity of information cannot be trusted from such misbehaving legitimate node as authenticity of network layer reachability information (NLRI) from an autonomous system is not a prime requirement in BGP. There is no systematic method to be applied on BGP for determination of information validity for any BGP speakers (routers). The absence of a method leaves a security hole. The paper proposes a method in the form of before and after attack to be run in the network having shared address space. By running the algorithm, the nature of misbehavior can be detected and analyzed for further action improving Byzantine robustness. Though the simulated method suffers from a limitation of giving cent percent stoppage of legitimate node, misbehavior of prefix hijacking but Byzantine attack can be mitigated as presented in the simulation results.