Anonymity Preserving and Lightweight Multimedical Server Authentication Protocol for Telecare Medical Information System

Electronic health systems, such as telecare medical information system (TMIS), allow patients to exchange their health information with a medical center/doctor for diagnosis in real time, and across borders. Given the sensitive nature of health information/medical data, ensuring the security of such systems is crucial. In this paper, we revisit Das et al.'s authentication protocol, which is designed to ensure patient anonymity and untraceability. Then, we demonstrate that the security claims are invalid, by showing how both security features (i.e., patient anonymity and untraceability) can be compromised. We also demonstrate that the protocol suffers from smartcard launch attacks. To mitigate such design flaws, we propose a new lightweight authentication protocol using the cryptographic hash function for TMIS. We then analyze the security of the proposed protocol using AVISPA and Scyther, two widely used formal specification tools. The performance analysis demonstrates that our protocol is more efficient than other competing protocols.