Equilibrium models of electricity market considering wind power producer and electric vehicle aggregator

Renewable energy such as wind power has an unstable nature. A joint operation of wind power with electric vehicles (EVs) or other energy storage devices is helpful to alleviate the negative effects of wind power integration on power systems. The impacts of different operation modes of wind power producer (WPP) and EV aggregator (EVA) on the market equilibrium outcomes are addressed in this paper. First, based on the oligopolistic competition theory, two stochastic equilibrium models of electricity market are proposed. One is for the case where the WPP and EVA bid separately in a non-cooperative mode, the other is for the case where the WPP and EVA form a virtual power plant (VPP) and bid in a cooperative mode to participate in the market competition. In these models, the scenario generation and reduction technique is employed to describe the uncertainty of wind speed. Secondly, the proposed equilibrium models are solved by GAMS software. Then based on the cooperative game theory, the Shapley value method is applied to allocate profits between the WPP and EVA in the VPP. Finally, numerical examples are presented to verify reasonableness and effectiveness of models. Simulation results show that when the WPP and EVA compete in a non-cooperative mode, they play a better role in peak shaving and valley filling in electricity markets. When the WPP and EVA bid in a cooperative mode, the WPP's expected bid error will be lowered and both profits of WPP and EVA will increase, which means that the WPP and EVA have incentives to form a VPP to participate in the electricity market.