Mechanism design for pricing and bandwidth allocation in heterogeneous wireless networks to maximize the social welfare

In this paper, we present a mechanism for bandwidth allocation and pricing in heterogeneous wireless networks. A proposed three stage game involves three types of agents 1) Network providers 2) Regulatory agent and 3) The Clients play the game. The goal of our mechanism design is increasing the social welfare means that while the network providers are satisfied from preparing and releasing the bandwidth, the clients deliver their bandwidth with a suitable price. When the Purchasing power in a society increases, we can interfere that the client welfare is increased but the very-low price for the products is not profitable for the producers thus to increase the social welfare we should attend to the welfare of network providers as well as the clients. The proposed mechanism guarantees the maximum payoff for the network providers and offers the clients to weighting and ranking the available networks and then prepares the best request bundle to receive the service. The violation from the proposed mechanism is not profitable for network providers and clients and as it is proved in the paper the allocation result is Pareto efficient.