Distributed Caching via Rewarding: An Incentive Caching Model for ICN

Information Centric Networking (ICN) leverages built-in caching capacity, termed as in-network caching, to support fast and efficient content distribution. The profits of ICN brought by its widespread in-network caching infrastructures has been well explored, but how to incentivize network players to deploy the socially optimal number of caches was largely ignored. Network players might not want to deploy or contribute their cache resources, if they do not have clear economic incentives, as cache deployment implies an extra capital expenditure. In this paper, we focus on the economic incentive interactions in caching deployment and usage between several types of network players in ICN. In particular, a Stackerlberg game model is used to capture the interactions between content provider (CP) and Internet service providers (ISPs). By using backward induction, it is proven that an equilibrium of the proposed model exists, under which both ISPs and CP can achieve their maximum utility. Numerical results show the effectiveness of the proposed model and the findings can provide important insights for network players to design efficient content sharing and caching schemes.