Secure Strategyproof Ascending-Price Spectrum Auction

Spectrum auction, as an ideal solution for the dynamic channel allocation problem, has become a research hotspot in recent years. Nevertheless, many spectrum auction schemes only focus on economic issues. They lack either a formal security guarantee of bidder privacy or certain auction properties, which may dampen potential bidders' enthusiasm. In this paper, we first point out that a recent ascendingprice auction scheme GAVEL (MobiHoc '16) failed to provide privacy since the bidder valuation for channels could be inferred by observing when the bidder quits the auction. In response, we design a privacy-preserving scheme which respects essential auction properties (strategyproofness, efficiency, and adaptive bidding) and spectrum properties (reusable and finegrained channels). Our formal security analysis proves that it is secure against semi-honest adversaries and thus protects the bidders' sensitive information including demand curves and true valuations. It is the first provably secure ascendingprice auction scheme for spectrum allocation to the best of our knowledge.