Optimal Pricing for Service Provision in IaaS Cloud Markets

Pricing plays an important role for service provision in cloud computing. In this paper, we investigate price based resource access control in two Monopoly IaaS cloud market, respectively. The two IaaS cloud market is formed by one public cloud service providers (CSPs) and cloud broker (CB), provisioning cloud services to delay-sensitive cloud users (CUs). In the first monopoly cloud market, we treat the public CSP as an M/M/1 queueing system and study this CSP's pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviours of self-interested CUs. We propose two pricing mechanisms with the objective of maximizing revenue and social welfare, respectively. In the second monopoly cloud market, the CB is modelled as an M/M/∞ queueing system, which has infinite capacity to serve a common pool of CUs. We also analyze how pricing affects the equilibrium behaviors of CUs and the revenue-optimal and social-optimal pricing strategies in view of this CSP.