Truthful Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Task Assignment

As an emerging human-solving paradigm, crowdsourcing has attracted much attention where requesters want to employ reliable workers to complete the specific task. Task assignment is a vital branch in crowdsourcing. Most existing works in crowdsourcing haven't taken self-interested individuals' strategy into account. To guarantee truthfulness, auction has been regarded as a promising form to charge requesters and reward workers. In this paper, we consider an online task assignment scenario, where each worker has a set of experienced skills, whereas specific task is budget-constrained and requires certain skill. Under this scenario, we model the crowdsourcing task assignment as a reverse auction in which requesters are buyers and workers are sellers. Specially, our paper studies simple task case where the requester ask for single skill. We propose TMC-VCG and TMC-ST and prove the related properties for the mechanisms theoretically. Meanwhile, through extensive simulations, we verify the truthfulness and also evaluate other performance.