Equilibriums in the Mobile-Virtual-Network-Operator-Oriented Data Offloading

Cellular networks are now facing severe traffic overload problems due to the explosive growth of mobile data traffic. One of the promising solutions is to offload part of the traffic through WiFi. In this paper, we investigate an oligopoly offloading market, where several mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) compete to serve end users using network infrastructures leased from the host mobile network operator (MNO). First, we study the competitive interaction among multiple MVNOs considering the overload problems of the offloading market. Then, we formulate the interaction as a noncooperative inventory game, where each MVNO determines the amount of cellular traffic provided to end users (named as the traffic inventory). Particularly, we investigate two different behavior patterns of the MVNOs known as Cournot and Stackelberg models. Then, we analyze and derive the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in each inventory game. Furthermore, algorithms are designed to achieve the equilibriums. Based on these analyses, we find the optimal inventory strategy for these competing MVNOs. Finally, simulation results demonstrate the interactions among the MNO, MVNOs, and end users in the offloading market.