‘RuNet 2020’ - deploying traditional elements of combat power in cyberspace?

In the recently approved Information Security Doctrine (Dec 5, 2016) Russia openly aims “to deploy a national system of managing the Russian segment of the internet”. For some time, we have observed how Russia has been conducting intellectual, legislative and technical measures in order to create a purely domestic network disconnected from the global internet by 2020. In the Russian way of thinking, fully state-controlled and independent RuNet - the Russian segment of the internet - will ensure stronger defence against external attacks. In this paper, we play with the thought that RuNet will be disconnected technically from the global internet by controlling the internet routing architecture inside Russia and that Russia is able to maintain operational capabilities outside of the global internet. Our aim is to discover what Russia's military aim with `RuNet 2020' could be. We argue that the strategy behind `RuNet 2020' can be analysed with conventional military tactics and by the deployment of traditional elements of combat power in the abstract cyberspace. We discuss that the military aim of `RuNet 2020' is not the evident protection improvement, but to improve own relative manoeuvrability. Moreover, `RuNet 2020' could increase relative firepower as well. Consequently, our aim is to show how and why the Russian leadership could rely on `RuNet 2020'.