An analysis of LPN based HB protocols

Hopper and Blum suggested a human authentication protocol (HB) for unaided humans based on shared secrets. It does not require specialized hardware or software and it works based on learning parity with noise. Evidently both human and the low cost pervasive devices cannot perform cryptographic authentication as they have inherent resource constraints. The human computer security can be used for pervasive devices and vice versa. This paper analyses the protocols based on HB and their strengths and weaknesses. The protocols are classified based on the mathematical structures used, attacks they are prone to and the suitability of application. The mathematical operations in each protocol determine the computation and communication cost of the protocol. Since energy conservation is a significant issue in RFID, the energy required for each protocol is studied. The cryptanalysis of the proposed protocols are studied and listed. The computation and communication cost of the various protocols are tabulated. This study is relevant in the present scenario as the same can be applied to any tiny device.