Reputation and User Requirement Based Price Modeling for Dynamic Spectrum Access

Secondary service providers can buy spectrum resources from primary service providers for a short or long period of time and exploit it to solve the problem of spectrum scarcity. This buying decision of spectrum buyers can depend on several factors including pricing of the spectrum, reputation of a seller, and duration of the contract and spectrum quality. However, existing pricing models for dynamic spectrum access consider mainly bandwidth which makes them unsuitable for real-world trading. In this paper, we consider these issues related to the pricing of spectrum sale in terms of microeconomic theories. First, we consider reputation of spectrum sellers and update it dynamically by considering a buyer's own trading experience with the sellers and collecting recommendations on sellers from other buyers. Second, trustworthiness of recommenders as well as incentive to encourage recommendations are modeled. Third, contract duration and spectrum quality are incorporated such that a buyer's utility is formulated as a function of buyer's resource requirement, reputation of seller and trustworthiness of recommenders. Fourth, the model is analyzed using dynamic pricing of the market and the solution is obtained using market equilibrium. Results demonstrate the superiority of our model over the existing microeconomic models for dynamic spectrum trading.