Understanding cost growth during operations of planetary missions: An explanation of changes

In the development of project cost estimates for interplanetary missions, considerable focus is generally given to the development of cost estimates for the development of ground, flight, and launch systems, i.e., Phases B, C, and D. Depending on the project team, efforts expended to develop cost estimates for operations (Phase E) may be relatively less rigorous than that devoted to estimates for ground and flight systems development. Furthermore, the project team may be challenged to develop a solid estimate of operations cost in the early stages of mission development, e.g., Concept Study Report or Systems Requirement Review (CSR/SRR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR), as mission specific peculiarities that impact cost may not be well understood. In addition, a methodology generally used to develop Phase E cost is engineering build-up, also known as “grass roots”. Phase E can include cost and schedule risks that are not anticipated at the time of the major milestone reviews prior to launch. If not incorporated into the engineering build-up cost method for Phase E, this may translate into an estimation of the complexity of operations and overall cost estimates that are not mature and at worse, insufficient. As a result, projects may find themselves with thin reserves during cruise and on-orbit operations or project overruns prior to the end of mission. This paper examines a set of interplanetary missions in an effort to better understand the reasons for cost and staffing growth in Phase E. The method used in the study is discussed as well as the major findings summarized as the Phase E Explanation of Change (EoC). Research for the study entailed the review of project materials, including Estimates at Completion (EAC) for Phase E and staffing profiles, major project milestone reviews, e.g., CSR, PDR, Critical Design Review (CDR), the interviewing of select project and mission management, and review of Phase E replan materials. From this work, a detailed picture is constructed of why cost grew during the operations phase, even to the level of specific events in the life of the missions. As a next step, the Phase E EoC results were gleaned and synthesized to produce leading indicators, i.e., what may be identifiable signs of cost and staffing growth that may be present as early as PDR or CDR. Both a qualitative and quantitative approach was used to determine leading indicators. These leading indicators will be reviewed and a practical method for their use will be discussed.