Investigating opportunistic spectrum access from a pricing perspective

In this paper, we extend the work in [1] to model the use of opportunistic spectrum access (OSA), which allows secondary users (SUs) to share the spectrum with primary users (PUs) on an opportunistic basis, using a Stackelberg game model from a pricing perspective. In this game model, the service provider (SP) as the leader aims to enhance its revenue while improving the utilization of its channel by allowing OSA without violating the PUs non-zero tolerated interference probability. We propose an analytical model, in which the SUs are charged based on the resource they could be allocated dynamically while the PUs are charged a discounted price as a compensation for the interference induced by the SUs. Our analysis provides characterization of the optimal price for the SUs and the optimal revenue of the SP as functions of channel utilization of the PUs and the number of potential SUs. It is shown through simulations that allowing OSA would improve revenue and channel utilization significantly for the SP when the channel is under-utilized, while it could potentially result in revenue loss when the channel is close to saturation. Moreover, we demonstrate that, by exploiting the SUs' willingness to pay, the SP could earn more from less SUs when the channel is under-utilized.