Stability analysis of power market with bounded rationality Cournot game

It is necessary for independent system operators to analyze whether power market leads to the stable equilibrium conditions while designing power exchanges and policies. In order to overcome the shortcomings of existed models and methods and more accurately model the game behaviors of market participants, the dynamic Cournot game model of power market with bounded rationality is proposed in this paper. With this model, the Nash equilibrium of power market and its stability are quantitatively analyzed, from which it can be seen that power market has different Nash equilibrium and even does not have the Nash equilibrium in the different market parameters and the corresponding different operating conditions of transmission network, i.e., congestion and noncongestion; the effect of market parameters is discussed on the stability of power market, from which it can be indicated that the smooth adjustment of generation quantities and the restriction of the maximum value of electricity price reinforce the stability of power market.