Behavior based strategies in radio resource sharing games

Radio resource sharing among different, co-located wireless networks operating on the same frequencies is an unsolved problem when networks operate in unlicensed frequency bands. We analyze such scenarios: in a stage-based game, wireless networks are modeled as players that attempt to meet individual quality of service requirements. Solution concepts derived from the game theory allow the analysis of such models. Games are analyzed under the microeconomic aspects of welfare, constant requirements, evolving demands, and the resulting utilities (payoffs). A multi stage game consists of repeated stages, where each stage represents the interaction of competing wireless networks for a limited duration (the duration of a single stage). Throughout the course of repeated stages, players attempt to optimize their payoffs by changing behaviors. Each player follows a strategy to determine what behavior to select in a stage, Multi stage game Nash equilibria for optimized quality of service support are determined in this paper. Results indicate that, depending on the requirements, cooperation is an achievable equilibrium that improves the overall radio resource utilization.