Revocable Identity-Based Blind Signature Scheme for End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting System

The emergence of internet voting systems (IVS) has empowered voters to express their opinions and cast their votes over the public internet. IVS represents a mechanism designed to operate fairly and efficiently even under conditions of high voter participation. Over the past decade, the development of IVS has been extensively discussed. However, traditional IVS continues to suffer from a lack of transparency during the election process. This deficiency implies that voters cannot be assured that their ballots are accurately recorded and counted as intended once they are submitted to the system. To address this issue, researchers have proposed enhancements to traditional IVS by introducing end-to-end verifiable internet voting systems (E2E-VIVS) that utilize identity-based blind signature (IBBS), named E2E-VIVSIBBS. This system allows voters to use their biometric features as identification to cast their votes secretly on public computers. Additionally, the system can provide voters with receipts, which enable them to verify whether their ballots have been recorded as intended. However, despite these advantages, the election commission of district (ECD) responsible for distributing ballots may fail to maintain its credibility. Therefore, the system must have the capability to revoke the ECD's ability to distribute ballots. In other words, the system needs to be able to revoke a malicious ECD to ensure security. To address this issue, we propose a new E2E-VIVS scheme using revocable IBBS (E2E-VIVS-RIBBS), which enables the system to revoke ECD. Based on the discrete logarithm assumption, we also demonstrate that our E2E-VIVSRIBBS scheme is secure.