Exploring the scope of a market mechanism in the allocation of shared spectrum in 6 GHz

This paper builds on the proposed evolved Spectrum Usage Rights (eSUR) framework to examine the potential for market mechanisms to reduce friction in shared access and use of the Upper 6 GHz (U6) band as well as establishing monetary assessment of a socio-economic value to be derived from such spectrum use arrangement. An eSUR license would be defined with conditions for interference control based on average received power level, much longer license duration, packaged to minimum viable sizes, and unrestricted options for trading. The proposition of shared use of the U6 band under a market approach for interference control is therefore the central point of this paper. A two-attribute auction design, with two initial MNO participation variants, is proposed in which an MNO’s bid for one band’s block consists of a price and a level of interference. Two VCG-based pricing rules are also proposed. If the regulator allows participation by the Wi-Fi networks community, an alternative concept of auction design is also proposed in which Wi-Fi community becomes a new, single bidder who bids collectively. Such a scenario is explored with two proposed auction configurations.