Cyberattack-Aware Control Structure Screening for Controller-Actuator False Data Injection Attack Isolation

This work presents a screening methodology that integrates cyberattack isolation capabilities as an additional criterion in the selection of the control system structure for processes subject to controller-actuator link attacks. We focus on a class of attack isolation schemes that utilize a bank of unknown input observers with dedicated residuals to identify false data injection attacks on the controller-actuator links. For this class of isolation schemes, the relationship between the control system structure and the ability of the isolation scheme to isolate specific controller-actuator link attacks is characterized. An attack isolation metric is introduced to quantify the isolation capabilities of different control structure candidates in terms of the number of controller-actuator links for which attacks can be isolated. A screening algorithm that systematically evaluates different control structure candidates using this metric is developed. The screening tool aims to support the selection of cyberattack-aware control structures that enable the isolation of controller-actuator link attacks. The developed screening methodology is applied to a simulated chemical process, and the attack isolation capabilities of a possible cyberattack-aware control system structure are demonstrated.