Associated Attack Surfaces and Vulnerabilities of Space Vehicle Autonomous Functions

According to the memorandum on Space Policy Directive 5 (SPD5) issued September 4, 2020, the United States considers unfettered freedom to operate in space vital to advancing our national security, economic prosperity, and scientific k nowledge. T he m emo c alled o n space system developers to apply the cyber security principles and practices used for terrestrial systems to space systems. More recently, the Executive Order (E.O.) 14110 on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) issued a call for developers of autonomous systems underpinned by AI technology to implement such technology with an established level of trust. This research aligns with the objectives of both presidential decrees with respect to the development of secure-by-design autonomous space vehicles. The anticipated benefits o f a utonomous capabilities in space systems are well understood; however, the cybersecurity risks are not. This research surveys the literature of autonomous terrestrial systems for lessons learned from cyber-attacks on those systems that can be applied to space systems with similar capabilities. The goal of cybersecurity in space is not simply immunity from cyber attack, but resiliency to attack, which means that even while under cyber-attack, the system is able to ‘fight through’ the attack and reconstitute itself while continuing the mission it was established for. For this reason, this research also surveyed the literature for effective strategies implemented on terrestrial systems which can be adapted to space systems to achieve this goal of cyber-attack resilient autonomous functionality. The goal is to define b oth t he c yber threat landscape for autonomous space systems and the strategies to best defend against those threats.