Multi-period Equilibrium in Coupled Transportation System and Transactive Energy Community

The large-scale deployment of distributed renewable energy sources enables traditional consumers to become prosumers in power distribution systems. Moreover, the increasing prevalence of electric vehicles (EVs) strengthens the coupling between the electricity and transportation sectors. It is highly desirable to propose a framework to effectively manage the emerging proactive prosumers and flexibility introduced by EVs in the coupled power distribution and transportation networks. In this context, this paper proposes a game-theoretic model for coupled transportation systems and transactive energy communities with prosumers to analyze the multi-period interactions of stakeholders and determine their optimal dispatch, aiming to minimize operational costs. A distribution-level transactive market design is proposed to enable the transactions of profit-maximizing prosumers in the energy community. In the transportation network, the routes and departure times of utility-maximizing drivers constitute a user equilibrium, where no drivers can reduce travel cost by unilaterally changing route or departure time. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the proposed multi-period game models are mathematically proven. The equilibrium solution can be obtained by solving its equivalent optimization problem. The numerical results demonstrate and analyze the time-dependent interactions among drivers and prosumers under the Nash equilibrium in the coupled transportation-power network.