ChameleonNet: Topology Obfuscation Against Tomography With Critical Information Hiding

Many network attacks, like link flooding attacks (LFAs), heavily rely on network topology information. Therefore, network topology obfuscation has been applied to counteract network topology inference and prevent topology information leakage. One effective way is to scheme a fake topology intentionally for attackers to map out. Focusing on reducing the similarity between the real and fake topologies, however, existing methods cannot promise that critical information of the network, such as critical nodes and links, is well hidden. To this end, we propose a new topology obfuscation mechanism, namely ChameleonNet, to protect the critical topology information of a given network. Specifically, ChameleonNet achieves topology obfuscation through a two-stage operation: 1) generating fake topology and 2) deploying fake topology. Our experiments on three real-world and two large-scale generated network topologies demonstrate that ChameleonNet can effectively reduce similarity between inferred and real topologies by 31%-37% and reliably hide critical topology information in terms of multiple statistical metrics.