Lightweight Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange for Industrial Internet of Things

Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols are widely deployed in many real-world applications to secure communication channels. Recently, side-channel attacks have been conducted to defeat traditional cryptographic protocols because a side-channel adversary can retrieve partial content of secret keys. Several leakage-resilient AKE (LRAKE) protocols have been presented to resist such attacks. However, existing LRAKE protocols are not suitable for the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environment due to their expensive public-key cryptographic operations. Even worse, IIoT devices have few security protection measures, making them very vulnerable to side-channel or information leakage attacks. In response to this challenge, this paper presents a novel lightweight LRAKE protocol called LLRAKE. By leveraging lightweight cryptographic primitives such as hash function, symmetric encryption, and secret sharing scheme, our protocol achieves dual objectives of perfect forward secrecy and leakage resilience. The sole reliance on lightweight cryptographic operations ensures that LLRAKE is well-suited for resource-constrained IIoT devices. Moreover, we give the formal security result of the proposed protocol in the random oracle model.