Distributed Resilient Control of DC Microgrids Under Unbounded FDI Attacks and Communication Link Faults Considering Balance of Charge State

This paper presents a fully distributed resilient secondary control approach for DC microgrids, designed to enhance resilience against unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks on control inputs and communication link faults. The approach links the injected power with the current state of charge (SoC) and the observed average SoC value, adjusting the droop coefficient in secondary control level for energy storage systems (ESSs) accordingly to prevent overuse of any single ESS. Each converter employs a resilient consensus-based secondary control strategy, effectively mitigating these sophisticated threats. A rigorous Lyapunov stability analysis verifies that the framework can maintain essential DC microgrid distributed control objectives, such as voltage regulation, proportional load sharing, and SoC balancing, even under unbounded FDI attacks and communication link faults. The practical effectiveness of the framework is demonstrated through hardware-in-the-loop experiments using Typhoon HIL 604, showcasing its improved resilience against the complex challenges posed by such FDI attacks.