Side-Channel Attack on Implementation of AES T-Box Encryption on STM32 Microcontroller Board

Encryption implementation in integrated circuits has become increasingly prevalent due to advancements in semiconductor manufacturing. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is widely employed in integrated circuits for security problems, using two implementations: S-Box and T-Box. Popular cryptographic libraries such as Mbed TLS, Libgcrypt, and OpenSSL have integrated AES T-Box, offering performance and computational speed advantages. This paper experiments with a side-channel attack on implementing AES-128 T-Box encryption on an STM32 microcontroller board. The entire 16-byte secret key of AES-128 T-Box was successfully recovered using Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis by analyzing electromagnetic traces. The results show the potential for information leakage in AES T-Box implementations on STM32 microcontroller boards and embedded systems in general, emphasizing the need for appropriate countermeasures.