Towards Quantum-Resistant Security: Pre-Silicon Power Side-Channel Leakage Analysis of CRYSTALS-Kyber

In response to the imperative for quantum-era data security, NIST standardized CRYSTALS-Kyber as a key-establishment algorithm. Despite mathematical robustness, potential side-channel vulnerabilities in CRYSTALS-Kyber risk data exposure. Pre-silicon evaluation of its resistance to side-channel attacks is crucial for real-world security. Current post-silicon validation practices may necessitate costly modifications. Our work presents the first pre-silicon power side-channel analysis of CRYSTALS-Kyber at the RTL level, quantifying leakage and identifying vulnerable modules. The NTT (Number Theoretic Transform) module mirrors the overall design's leakage pattern, suggesting modules in NTT multiplication contribute to the highest leakage, posing a potential threat to the secret key. These findings guide proactive measures in early design, fortifying defenses against RTL-level side-channel attacks.