PkT-SIN: A Secure Communication Protocol for Space Information Networks With Periodic k-Time Anonymous Authentication

Space Information Network (SIN) enables universal Internet connectivity for any object, even in remote and extreme environments where deploying a cellular network is difficult. Access authentication is crucial for ensuring user access control in SIN and preventing unauthorized entities from gaining access to network services. However, due to the complex communication environment in SIN, including exposed links and higher signal delay, designing a secure and efficient authentication scheme presents a significant challenge. In this paper, we propose a secure communication protocol for SIN with periodic k-time anonymous authentication (named PkT-SIN) that allows satellite users to anonymously authenticate to ground stations at most k times in each single time period. An efficient handover mechanism is designed to ensure seamless communication for satellite users to communicate with different satellites and ground stations, taking into account the dynamic topology of SIN. As a core component of PkT-SIN, we propose a novel primitive, periodic k-time keyed-verification anonymous credential (PkT-KVAC), that enables users to derive k tokens from a credential for anonymous and unlinkable authentication. On the other hand, a verifier can always recognize a reused token from a dishonest user. PkT-KVAC is of independent contribution to anonymous authentication in pay-per-use business scenarios. Formal security proofs confirm that PkT-SIN and PkT-KVAC have desired security features. The supremacy of their computing features is demonstrated through comprehensive comparison and rigorous performance analysis.