Experimental System for Supply Chain Cyber-Security of Distribution Switch Controls

Cyberattacks that rely on the software supply chain as their attack vector are becoming more frequent and effective. Attacks such as SolarWinds, NotPetya, and XcodeGhost have demonstrated the vulnerabilities of cybersecurity practices against these attacks. The Georgia Institute of Technology has developed GridTrust, a supply-chain cybersecurity framework based on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF), which provides a hardware-based root-of-trust for authentication. This paper describes the application and laboratory testing of GridTrust technologies for the use case of software updates of distribution-level pole-mounted switch controls. Two tests were performed. One involves blocking a malicious update sent to a pole switch, which would force the relay to operate the switch by changing the phase overcurrent tripping threshold. The second test involves a simulated malicious SCADA command to the relay.