Improving Prefix Hijacking Defense of RPKI From an Evolutionary Game Perspective

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) defends against BGP prefix hijacking by signing Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) and filtering malicious BGP routes with ROAs. However, RPKI's low deployment weakens its defense against prefix hijacking. In the absence of a large fraction of Autonomous Systems (ASes) signing ROAs, the incentive to use filtering to eliminate hijacked prefixes commensurately decreases. There is a cyclic dependency here because reduced filtering in turn lessens the incentive for non-adoptees to become adoptees. Previous studies on RPKI deployment are mainly from the measurement perspective or focus on the deployment of large Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The above circular dependency problem inside the RPKI has not been fully studied. To improve RPKI's defense, this paper studies the circular dependency problem from an evolutionary game theory perspective. We model the strategy evolution of ASes choosing to deploy signing alone, deploy filtering alone, or deploy both signing and filtering. The results show that when the deployment rates of signing and filtering reach a certain range, the evolution can reach an ideal deployment state at a faster speed. Therefore, to increase the probability of evolution reaching the ideal deployment state, we propose RPKIN to widen this interval and reduce the minimum deployment rate required for signing and filtering.