An Efficient Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection Based on Side-Channel Analysis

System security has historically been correlated with the security of the data being handled. Hardware Trojans are pieces of hardware that are concealed inside a more substantial piece of hardware. Hardware Trojan threats are covert components that are secretly inserted inside integrated circuits with the purpose of attacking and destroying integrated circuits. In this study, side-channel analysis is used to detect hardware Trojans in circuits. This method aims to identify a Hardware Trojan with a lower likelihood of being activated using a golden reference. A novel method based on path delay measurement has been proposed that covers all the trojan-vulnerable paths under analysis for Trojan detection. This method is capable of detecting both the presence of a trojan and its location if we backtrace suspected paths. It is evaluated on ITC’ 99, ISCAS’ 85, and ISCAS’ 89 benchmark circuits using Xilinx Vivado and Synopsys DC compiler. The results show overall Trojan detectability accuracy of 99% under worst process variation with a precision of 0.001 ns.