A Secure UAV Cooperative Communication Framework: Prospect Theory Based Approach

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have attracted extensive attention from both industry and academia owing to their high mobility, line-of-sight (LoS) characteristics of air-toground (A2G) channels, and low cost. However, the broadcast nature of wireless transmission and the LoS characteristics of A2G channels are vulnerable to eavesdropping attack, which leads to severe security issues. To enhance the security of UAV communication, we propose a framework that multiple UAVs cooperate to resist attacks (MURA). Specifically, we first propose an efficient incentive scheme based on the coalitional game to encourage UAVs to join the coalition. We prove that each UAV can maximize its utility by joining the coalition to form a grand coalition. Then, a secure UAV communication scheme is proposed to resist eavesdropping attack. Two types of scenarios are considered for UAV communication. In a completely rational scenario, in which participants make decisions aiming to maximize their utility, we utilize the Stackelberg game to model the interactions between UAVs and attacker. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution are proved, and the equilibrium solution is obtained. In an imperfectly rational scenario, the prospect theory (PT) is applied to capture the underlying rationality of the players. The PT valuations of the players, i.e., UAV and attacker, are deduced in detail. Meanwhile, the convergence of the PT valuations of UAV and attacker is proved. Finally, extensive simulation results show that the proposed scheme can effectively improve the utility of legal UAVs and ensure the security of the UAV networks compared with benchmarks.