Random Beliefs in Cournout Competition

The authors focus on a problem on equilibrium control in Cournout competition. Our approach uses Cognitive Approach to Reasoning. From one point of view agents plays a game with a fixed market size, and at the same time they have their own beliefs about what market size really is. It influence the equilibrium and the control center has to choose which agent’s gap between normative market size and descriptive agent’s belief about market size contol center wants to eleminate. This work adresses the next step problem - what if random beliefs about market size are random for control center and he or she has tp treat the game as an optimization problem where we use technology or belief control to achieve a maximum of some our function. The article contains formalizaiton of the first p art of this this stohastic problem, that is a calculation of mean utility for the center if no control has been applied. There are a lot of numerical simulations in the paper too. These simulations includes best response dynamics analysis.