Design and implementation of a mechanism to identify and defend against ARP spoofing

One of the most frequently discussed computer security breaches is the Man-In-The-Middle attack(MITM), which is causing significant worry among security professionals. Attackers aim to obtain the data being exchanged between end-points and compromise its integrity and secrecy. In most situations, MITM attacks are primarily based on Address resolution protocol(ARP) poisoning. The primary weakness of ARP lies in its stateless nature. As a result, it is unable to monitor answers to issued queries. In this study, we proposed a novel approach that accomplishes a number of objectives and offers a number of advantages over conventional methods. The objectives of proposed approach are, to strengthen the address resolution protocol so that it becomes a stateful protocol with making a demand depending on the bogus attacker answers received in order to prevent cache poisoning attacks by disregarding the unregister reply and to establish a dependency between the host’s Media Access Control(MAC) and Internet Protocol(IP) addresses. The objective is to protect the LAN setting not just against MITM attacks, but also against comparable forms of hazards. Experiments were carried out by establishing a virtual network in order to test the functionality of the suggested mechanism. Experiment findings suggest that the proposed method can identify and reduce ARP poisoning.