A non-cooperative game-theoretic approach for the flexible operation of multi-microgrids

The literature on incentive-driven, market-oriented demand-side management in microgrids has focused almost entirely on minimizing the operating cost, but failed to characterize the competitive relationships in decentralized energy markets. Accordingly, this has led to producing clear evidence of their underperformance when applied in real-world settings. In response, using ideas from non-cooperative game theory to address behavioral risk factors, this paper introduces an aggregator-mediated, demand response scheduling framework in a two-layer arrangement, and integrates it into an optimal day-ahead energy management model of grid-connected multi-microgrids. The results obtained by applying the proposed model to a conceptual multi-microgrid system, have demonstrated its effectiveness in yielding the best compromise solution between demand response utilization and electricity imports. More specifically, the results indicate that the suggested model can reduce the test-case system’s daily operating cost by up to ~41% by finding a well-balanced solution with respect to the optimal decisions made by competing players in a strategic setting.