GPS Spoofing Attacks Detection Using Defensive Schemes in FANETs

Groups of UAVs working together in an Ad-Hoc net are called Flying Ad-Hoc Networks (FANETs). owing to their cheap cost & excellent efficiency, UAVs have attracted hostile safety risks owing to their broad adoption. The failure of UAVs to avoid these assaults is based on their processing limitations, battery life, particularly the complexity of the algorithms they can run. GPS, or the Global Positioning System, is essential for geolocation in FANETs. One of the major difficulties with FANETs is GPS tampering an attack that may be launched with relative ease. In this scenario, fake GPS coordinates are used to fool civilian unencrypted GPS transmissions & cause UAVs to crash into one other or be kidnapped. Several solutions were presented by the research community to protect FANETs against GPS Spoofing attacks. This work presents a thorough literature review of GPS spoofing assaults in FANETs along with defensive mechanisms to aid future research. Existing defensive systems were categorized according to their goals (detection, reduction, and/or avoidance) as well as the basis (relying on measurements collected by different drones' devices/sensors, analyzing the signals obtained from various sensors, utilizing machine learning computations, leveraging game theory, or utilizing cryptographic methods to verify and safeguard the secrecy of GPS signals). Finally, a game-theoretic approach is suggested for identifying GPS spoofing attacks.