Differential Game Study of Competitive Supply Chain Based on Sustainable Innovation of Public Technology

Sustainable technological innovation is seen as an important tool for achieving sustainable development and addressing global challenges. The current major social challenges and global issues facing humanity have increased the demand for a sustainable supply of technological innovation in the public sector. This paper constructs a public technology innovation supply chain consisting of the government and two competitive firms in the context of public technology innovation. The model considers four strategic types of government cost subsidies and studies the public technology innovation investment decisions of supply chain members based on optimal control and dynamic differential games. The equilibrium strategies of public technological innovation under different models are compared and analyzed. Combined with numerical simulations, the paper analyzes the effects of competitive intensity on enterprise R&D innovation strategy, government subsidy rate, enterprise brand goodwill and supply chain performance under different models and verifies the rationality of the models. The results show that: (1) Although competition among firms harms the profits of the low-type firm, it increases the overall performance of the public technology innovation supply chain and government benefits, and promotes the innovation efforts of the high-type firm. (2) Asymmetric cost sharing by the government hinders the profit growth of firms without cost subsidies. (3) The goal of equal benefits for supply chain members can only be achieved under symmetric government subsidies. Theoretically, this paper provides new ideas for the study of supply chains for sustainable innovation in public technology from a dynamic perspective. Practically, this study provides a reference for the behavioral decisions of government and firms in public technology innovation cooperation.