A Work-Around Methodology for Non-Executable Aggregate Functions on Encrypted Databases

Any provider offering application service must perform queries in an untraceable manner on a database which is encrypted without revealing the plain data, and there is a current global demand for methodologies related to protecting sensitive data. Queries should first be converted into encrypted format before execution in the database environment. Past investigations in the field suggested a novel middleware architecture for database encrypting systems to address the issue with the encryption mechanisms that the existing database systems provide. They also illustrate the middleware's cryptography strategies, present an algorithm for constructing encrypted indexes and query transformations, and analyze protection for encrypted indexes. Although researchers developed an encrypted query execution model using SQL that have undergone randomized encryption algorithms which affect concerns of users, other difficulties with searching protected information have emerged as information cannot be accessed by the cloud provider from the main source of the database. The sole means of allaying people’ concerns about data privacy is encryption. Therefore, rather than modifying cryptography that would compromise security limitations, we suggest a general work-around approach for non-executable aggregate functions on encrypted databases employing executable aggregate functions.