A Longitudinal and Comprehensive Measurement of DNS Strict Privacy

The DNS privacy protection mechanisms, DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH), only work correctly if both the server and client support the Strict Privacy profile and no vulnerability exists in the implemented TLS/HTTPS. A natural question then arises: what is the landscape of DNS Strict Privacy? To this end, we provide the first longitudinal and comprehensive measurement of DoT/DoH deployments in recursive resolvers, authoritative servers, and browsers. With the collected data, we find the number of DoT/DoH servers increased substantially during our ten-month-long scan. However, around 60% of DoT and 44% of DoH recursive resolver certificates are invalid. Worryingly, our measurements confirm the centralization problem of DoT/DoH. Furthermore, we classify DNS Strict Privacy servers into four levels according to daily scanning results on TLS/HTTPS-related security features. Unfortunately, around 25% of DoH Strict Privacy recursive resolvers fail to meet the minimum level requirements. To help the Internet community better perceive the landscape of DNS Strict Privacy, we implement a DoT/DoH server search engine and recommender system. Additionally, we investigate five popular browsers across four operating systems and find some inconsistent behavior with their DNS privacy implementations. For example, Firefox in Windows, Linux, and Android allows DoH communication with the server without the SAN certificate. At last, we advocate that all participants head together for a bright DNS Strict Privacy landscape by discussing current hindrances and controversies in DNS privacy.