RPAS integration within an Australian ATM system: What equipment and which airspace

The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) currently lists more than 100 separate entities or organisations which maintain a UAS Operator Certificate (UOC) [1]. Approved operations are overwhelmingly a permutation of aerial photography, surveillance, survey or spotting and predominantly, are restricted to Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) operations, below 400 feet, and not within 3 NM of an aerodrome. However, demand is increasing for a Remote Piloted Aerial System (RPAS) regulatory regime which facilitates more expansive operations, in particular unsegregated, Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations. Despite this demand, there is national and international apprehension regarding the necessary levels of airworthiness and operational regulation required to maintain safety and minimise the risk associated with unsegregated operations. Fundamental to addressing these legitimate concerns will be the mechanisms that underpin safe separation and collision avoidance. Whilst a large body of research has been dedicated to investigating on-board, Sense and Avoid (SAA) technology necessary to meet this challenge, this paper focuses on the contribution of the NAS to separation assurance, and how it will support, as well as complicate RPAS integration. The paper collates and presents key, but historically disparate, threads of Australian RPAS and NAS related information, and distils it with a filter focused on minimising RPAS collision risk. Our ongoing effort is motivated by the need to better understand the separation assurance contribution provided by the NAS layers, in the first instance, and subsequently employ this information to identify scenarios where the coincident collision risk is demonstrably low, providing legitimate substantiation for concessions on equipage and airworthiness standards.