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Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on

Issue 6 • Date August 2007

 This issue contains several parts.Go to:  Part Supplement 

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Displaying Results 1 - 25 of 27
  • IEEE Journal On Selected Areas In Communications - Table of Contents

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): c1
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  • IEEE Communications Society

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): c2
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  • Guest Editorial Non-Cooperative Behavior in Networking

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1065 - 1068
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (486 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    The 17 papers in this special issue focus on non-cooperative behavior in networking. They deal with non-cooperative behaviors arising from a wide variety of networks: cellular, wireless LAN, ad hoc networks and wireline networks. From a protocol layering perspective, they address game-theoretic issues in (1) modulation, power control, and subchannel assignment in the physical later, (2) contention... View full abstract»

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  • A Game-Theoretic Approach to Energy-Efficient Modulation in CDMA Networks with Delay QoS Constraints

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1069 - 1078
    Cited by:  Papers (35)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (731 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    A game-theoretic framework is used to study the effect of constellation size on the energy efficiency of wireless networks for M-QAM modulation. A non-cooperative game is proposed in which each user seeks to choose its transmit power (and possibly transmit symbol rate) as well as the constellation size in order to maximize its own utility while satisfying its delay quality-of-service (QoS) constra... View full abstract»

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  • Non-cooperative resource competition game by virtual referee in multi-cell OFDMA networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1079 - 1090
    Cited by:  Papers (76)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (904 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In this paper, a distributive non-cooperative game is proposed to perform sub-channel assignment, adaptive modulation, and power control for multi-cell multi-user orthogonal frequency division multiplexing access (OFDMA) networks. Each individual user's goal is to minimize his/her own transmitted power in a distributed manner under the constraints that the desirable rate is achieved and the transm... View full abstract»

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  • Convergence of Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm for Gaussian Interference Channels

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1091 - 1100
    Cited by:  Papers (87)  |  Patents (1)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (722 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    First Page of the Article
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  • Non-cooperative power control for wireless ad hoc networks with repeated games

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1101 - 1112
    Cited by:  Papers (33)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (479 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    One of the distinctive features in a wireless ad hoc network is lack of any central controller or single point of authority, in which each node/link then makes its own decisions independently. Therefore, fully cooperative behaviors, such as cooperation for increasing system capacity, mitigating interference for each other, or honestly revealing private information, might not be directly applied. I... View full abstract»

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  • Distributed Contention Window Control for Selfish Users in IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1113 - 1123
    Cited by:  Papers (8)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (540 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In this paper, we study non-cooperative user behavior in random-access wireless networks in which users have freedom to choose their back-off contention window size according to network's congestion status. We formulate a non- cooperative game and show the existence and uniqueness of its equilibrium point. We also propose an iterative method leading to the equilibrium point of the game. A discussi... View full abstract»

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  • Robust detection of selfish misbehavior in wireless networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1124 - 1134
    Cited by:  Papers (32)  |  Patents (1)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (894 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    The CSMA/CA protocols are designed under the assumption that all participant nodes would abide to the protocol rules. This is of particular importance in distributed protocols such as the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordinating function (DCF), in which nodes control their own backoff parameters. In this work, we propose a method to detect selfish misbehaving terminals that may deliberately modify its... View full abstract»

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  • Reverse-Engineering MAC: A Non-Cooperative Game Model

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1135 - 1147
    Cited by:  Papers (32)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (557 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper reverse-engineers backoff-based random-access MAC protocols in ad-hoc networks. We show that the contention resolution algorithm in such protocols is implicitly participating in a non-cooperative game. Each link attempts to maximize a selfish local utility function, whose exact shape is reverse-engineered from the protocol description, through a stochastic subgradient method in which th... View full abstract»

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  • Partially Optimal Routing

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1148 - 1160
    Cited by:  Papers (5)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (1058 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Most large-scale communication networks, such as the Internet, consist of interconnected administrative domains. While source (or selfish) routing, where transmission follows the least cost path for each source, is reasonable across domains, service providers typically engage in traffic engineering to improve operating performance within their own network. Motivated by this observation, we develop... View full abstract»

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  • Hidden-Action in Network Routing

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1161 - 1172
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (409 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In communication networks, such as the Internet or mobile ad-hoc networks, the actions taken by intermediate nodes or links are typically hidden from the communicating endpoints; all the endpoints can observe is whether or not the end-to-end transmission was successful. Therefore, in the absence of incentives to the contrary, rational (i.e., selfish) intermediaries may choose to forward messages a... View full abstract»

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  • Bottleneck Routing Games in Communication Networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1173 - 1179
    Cited by:  Papers (10)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (562 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, each associated with a positive flow demand, and a load-dependent performance function for each network element; the social (i.e., system) objective is to optimize the performance of the worst element in the network (i.e., the... View full abstract»

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  • Competition in Parallel-Serial Networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1180 - 1192
    Cited by:  Papers (11)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (347 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We study the efficiency implications of competition among profit-maximizing service providers in communication networks. Service providers set prices for transmission of flows through their (sub)network. The central question is whether the presence of prices will help or hinder network performance. We investigate this question by considering the difference between users' willingness to pay and del... View full abstract»

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  • Non-Cooperative Multicast and Facility Location Games

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1193 - 1206
    Cited by:  Papers (6)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (646 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider a multicast game with selfish non- cooperative players. There is a special source node and each player is interested in connecting to the source by making a routing decision that minimizes its payment. The mutual influence of the players is determined by a cost sharing mechanism, which in our case evenly splits the cost of an edge among the players using it. We consider two different m... View full abstract»

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  • Multihoming of Users to Access Points in WLANs: A Population Game Perspective

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1207 - 1215
    Cited by:  Papers (33)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (449 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider non-cooperative mobiles, each faced with the problem of which subset of WLANs access points (APs) to connect and multihome to, and how to split its traffic among them. Considering the many users regime, we obtain a potential game model and study its equilibrium. We obtain pricing for which the total throughput is maximized at equilibrium and study the convergence to equilibrium under v... View full abstract»

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  • Optimal Nonlinear Pricing for a Monopolistic Network Service Provider with Complete and Incomplete Information

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1216 - 1223
    Cited by:  Papers (23)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (217 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In the communication network pricing literature, it is the linear pricing schemes that have been largely adopted as the means of controlling network usage or generating profits for network service providers. This paper extends the framework to nonlinear pricing and investigates optimal nonlinear pricing policy design for a monopolistic service provider. The problem is formulated as an incentive-de... View full abstract»

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  • Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1224 - 1236
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (270 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Congestion games are non-cooperative games where the utility of a player from using a certain resource depends on the total number of players that are using the same resource. While most work so far took a distributed game-theoretic approach to this problem, this paper studies centralized solutions for congestion games. The first part of the paper analyzes the problem from a computational perspect... View full abstract»

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  • VCG-Kelly Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Goods: Adapting VCG Mechanisms to One-Dimensional Signals

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1237 - 1243
    Cited by:  Papers (22)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (382 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    rdquoThe VCG-Kelly mechanism is proposed, which is obtained by composing the communication efficient, one- dimensional signaling idea of Kelly with the VCG mechanism, providing efficient allocation for strategic buyers at Nash equilibrium points. It is shown that the revenue to the seller can be maximized or minimized using a particular one-dimensional family of surrogate valuation functions. View full abstract»

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  • Efficiency of Market-Based Resource Allocation among Many Participants

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1244 - 1259
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (397 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Market mechanisms have been suggested in the last few years as a tool for allocating shared networks resources among several competing users. In this paper, we consider the efficiency loss of such mechanisms in the presence of a large number of users. We model the user interactions as a game with a heterogeneous population of players characterized by random utility functions. If the utility functi... View full abstract»

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  • Call for Papers - IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communications - Exploiting Limited Feedback in Tomorrow's Wireless Communication Networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1260
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  • Call for Papers - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications - Broadband Access Networks: Architectures and Protocols

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1261
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  • Call for Papers - IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communications - Underwater Wireless Communications and Networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1262
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  • Online Tutorials

    Publication Year: 2007
    Request Permissions | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (422 KB)  

    First Page of the Article
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  • Information for Authors IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication (J-SAC)

    Publication Year: 2007
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    Provides instructions and guidelines to prospective authors who wish to submit manuscripts. View full abstract»

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Aims & Scope

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications focuses on all telecommunications, including telephone, telegraphy, facsimile, and point-to-point television, by electromagnetic propagation.

Full Aims & Scope

Meet Our Editors

Editor-in-Chief
Muriel Médard
MIT