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Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on

Issue 6 • Date August 2007

 This issue contains several parts.Go to:  Part Supplement 

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  • IEEE Journal On Selected Areas In Communications - Table of Contents

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): c1
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  • IEEE Communications Society

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): c2
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  • Guest Editorial Non-Cooperative Behavior in Networking

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1065 - 1068
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (486 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    The 17 papers in this special issue focus on non-cooperative behavior in networking. They deal with non-cooperative behaviors arising from a wide variety of networks: cellular, wireless LAN, ad hoc networks and wireline networks. From a protocol layering perspective, they address game-theoretic issues in (1) modulation, power control, and subchannel assignment in the physical later, (2) contention window in the MAC layer, (3) multihoming and routing in the network layer, and (4) resource allocation. View full abstract»

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  • A Game-Theoretic Approach to Energy-Efficient Modulation in CDMA Networks with Delay QoS Constraints

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1069 - 1078
    Cited by:  Papers (30)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (731 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    A game-theoretic framework is used to study the effect of constellation size on the energy efficiency of wireless networks for M-QAM modulation. A non-cooperative game is proposed in which each user seeks to choose its transmit power (and possibly transmit symbol rate) as well as the constellation size in order to maximize its own utility while satisfying its delay quality-of-service (QoS) constraint. The utility function used here measures the number of reliable bits transmitted per joule of energy consumed, and is particularly suitable for energy-constrained networks. The best-response strategies and Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed game are derived. It is shown that in order to maximize its utility (in bits per joule), a user must choose the lowest constellation size that can accommodate the user's delay constraint. This strategy is different from one that would maximize spectral efficiency. Using this framework, the tradeoffs among energy efficiency, delay, throughput and constellation size are also studied and quantified. In addition, the effect of trellis-coded modulation on energy efficiency is discussed. View full abstract»

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  • Non-cooperative resource competition game by virtual referee in multi-cell OFDMA networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1079 - 1090
    Cited by:  Papers (65)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (904 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In this paper, a distributive non-cooperative game is proposed to perform sub-channel assignment, adaptive modulation, and power control for multi-cell multi-user orthogonal frequency division multiplexing access (OFDMA) networks. Each individual user's goal is to minimize his/her own transmitted power in a distributed manner under the constraints that the desirable rate is achieved and the transmitted power is bounded. The pure non-cooperative game may result in non-convergence or some undesirable Nash Equilibriums with low system and individual performances. To enhance the performances, a virtual referee is introduced to the networks and is in charge of monitoring and improving the outcome of non-cooperative competition for resources among the distributed users. If the game outcome is not desirable, either the required transmission rates should be reduced or some users should be prevented from using some radio resources such as sub-channels, so that the rest of users can share the limited resources more efficiently. Moreover, it can be shown that the introduction of the virtual referee does not increase the complexity of the networks. From the simulation results in a two-cell case, the proposed scheme reduces the transmitted power by 80% and 25% compared with the fixed channel assignment algorithm and the iterative water-filling algorithm in the literature, respectively. The achievable rate can be improved by 10%. In a multi-cell case, the proposed scheme can have up to 40% power reduction compared with the iterative water-filling algorithm when the co-channel interferences are severe. View full abstract»

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  • Convergence of Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm for Gaussian Interference Channels

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1091 - 1100
    Cited by:  Papers (83)  |  Patents (1)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (722 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

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  • Non-cooperative power control for wireless ad hoc networks with repeated games

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1101 - 1112
    Cited by:  Papers (30)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (479 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    One of the distinctive features in a wireless ad hoc network is lack of any central controller or single point of authority, in which each node/link then makes its own decisions independently. Therefore, fully cooperative behaviors, such as cooperation for increasing system capacity, mitigating interference for each other, or honestly revealing private information, might not be directly applied. It has been shown that power control is an efficient approach to achieve quality of service (QoS) requirement in ad hoc networks. However, the existing work has largely relied on cooperation among different nodes/links or a pricing mechanism that often needs a third-party involvement. In this paper, we aim to design a non-cooperative power control algorithm without pricing mechanism for ad hoc networks. We view the interaction among the users' decision for power level as a repeated game. With the theory of stochastic fictitious play (SFP), we propose a reinforcement learning algorithm to schedule each user's power level. There are three distinctive features in our proposed scheme. First, the user's decision at each stage is self-incentive with myopic best response correspondence. Second, the dynamics arising from our proposed algorithm eventually converges to pure Nash equilibrium (NE). Third, our scheme does not need any information exchange or to observe the opponents' private information. Therefore, this proposed algorithm can safely run in a fully selfish environment without any additional pricing and secure mechanism. Simulation study demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed scheme. View full abstract»

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  • Distributed Contention Window Control for Selfish Users in IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1113 - 1123
    Cited by:  Papers (7)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (540 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In this paper, we study non-cooperative user behavior in random-access wireless networks in which users have freedom to choose their back-off contention window size according to network's congestion status. We formulate a non- cooperative game and show the existence and uniqueness of its equilibrium point. We also propose an iterative method leading to the equilibrium point of the game. A discussion of alternative game formulations in the same problem context is also given. View full abstract»

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  • Robust detection of selfish misbehavior in wireless networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1124 - 1134
    Cited by:  Papers (27)  |  Patents (1)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (894 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    The CSMA/CA protocols are designed under the assumption that all participant nodes would abide to the protocol rules. This is of particular importance in distributed protocols such as the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordinating function (DCF), in which nodes control their own backoff parameters. In this work, we propose a method to detect selfish misbehaving terminals that may deliberately modify its backoff window to gain unfair access to the network resources. We develop nonparametric batch and sequential detectors based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) statistics that do not require any modification on the existing CSMA/CA protocols, and we apply it to detect misbehaviors in an IEEE 802.11 DCF network using the ns-2 simulator. We compare the performance of the proposed detectors with the optimum detectors with perfect information about the misbehavior strategy, for both the batch case (based on the Neyman-Pearson test), and the sequential case (based on Wald's sequential probability ratio test). We show that the proposed nonparametric detectors have a performance comparable to the optimum detectors for the majority of misbehaviors (the more severe) without any knowledge of the misbehavior strategies. View full abstract»

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  • Reverse-Engineering MAC: A Non-Cooperative Game Model

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1135 - 1147
    Cited by:  Papers (27)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (557 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    This paper reverse-engineers backoff-based random-access MAC protocols in ad-hoc networks. We show that the contention resolution algorithm in such protocols is implicitly participating in a non-cooperative game. Each link attempts to maximize a selfish local utility function, whose exact shape is reverse-engineered from the protocol description, through a stochastic subgradient method in which the link updates its persistence probability based on its transmission success or failure. We prove that existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed in general. Then we establish the minimum amount of backoff aggressiveness needed, as a function of density of active users, for uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and convergence of the best response strategy. Convergence properties and connection with the best response strategy are also proved for variants of the stochastic-subgradient-based dynamics of the game. Together with known results in reverse-engineering TCP and BGP, this paper further advances the recent efforts in reverse-engineering layers 2-4 protocols. In contrast to the TCP reverse-engineering results in earlier literature, MAC reverse-engineering highlights the non-cooperative nature of random access. View full abstract»

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  • Partially Optimal Routing

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1148 - 1160
    Cited by:  Papers (4)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (1058 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Most large-scale communication networks, such as the Internet, consist of interconnected administrative domains. While source (or selfish) routing, where transmission follows the least cost path for each source, is reasonable across domains, service providers typically engage in traffic engineering to improve operating performance within their own network. Motivated by this observation, we develop and analyze a model of partially optimal routing, where optimal routing within subnetworks is overlaid with selfish routing across domains. We demonstrate that optimal routing within a subnetwork does not necessarily improve the performance of the overall network. In particular, when Braess' paradox occurs in the network, partially optimal routing may lead to worse overall network performance. We provide bounds on the worst-case loss of efficiency that can occur due to partially optimal routing. For example, when all congestion costs can be represented by affine latency functions and all administrative domains have a single entry and exit point, the worst-case loss of efficiency is no worse than 25% relative to the optimal solution. In the presence of administrative domains incorporating multiple entry and/or exit points, however, the performance of partially optimal routing can be arbitrarily inefficient even with linear latencies. We also provide conditions for traffic engineering to be individually optimal for service providers. View full abstract»

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  • Hidden-Action in Network Routing

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1161 - 1172
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (409 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In communication networks, such as the Internet or mobile ad-hoc networks, the actions taken by intermediate nodes or links are typically hidden from the communicating endpoints; all the endpoints can observe is whether or not the end-to-end transmission was successful. Therefore, in the absence of incentives to the contrary, rational (i.e., selfish) intermediaries may choose to forward messages at a low priority or simply not forward messages at all. Using a principal-agent model, we show how the hidden-action problem can be overcome through appropriate design of contracts in both the direct (the endpoints contract with each individual router directly) and the recursive (each router contracts with the next downstream router) cases. We further show that, depending on the network topology, per-hop or per-path monitoring may not necessarily improve the utility of the principal or the social welfare of the system. View full abstract»

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  • Bottleneck Routing Games in Communication Networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1173 - 1179
    Cited by:  Papers (9)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (562 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, each associated with a positive flow demand, and a load-dependent performance function for each network element; the social (i.e., system) objective is to optimize the performance of the worst element in the network (i.e., the network bottleneck). Although we show that such "bottleneck" routing games appear in a variety of practical scenarios, they have not been considered yet. Accordingly, we study their properties, considering two routing scenarios, namely when a user can split its traffic over more than one path (splittable bottleneck game) and when it cannot (unsplittable bottleneck game). First, we prove that, for both splittable and unsplittable bottleneck games, there is a (not necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium. Then, we consider the rate of convergence to a Nash equilibrium in each game. Finally, we investigate the efficiency of the Nash equilibria in both games with respect to the social optimum; specifically, while for both games we show that the price of anarchy is unbounded, we identify for each game conditions under which Nash equilibria are socially optimal. View full abstract»

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  • Competition in Parallel-Serial Networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1180 - 1192
    Cited by:  Papers (11)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (347 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We study the efficiency implications of competition among profit-maximizing service providers in communication networks. Service providers set prices for transmission of flows through their (sub)network. The central question is whether the presence of prices will help or hinder network performance. We investigate this question by considering the difference between users' willingness to pay and delay costs as the efficiency metric. Previous work has demonstrated that in networks consisting of parallel links, efficiency losses from competition are bounded. Nevertheless, parallel-link networks are special, and in most networks, traffic has to simultaneously traverse links (or subnetworks) operated by independent service providers. The simplest network topology allowing this feature is the parallel-serial structure, which we study in this paper. In contrast to existing results, we show that in the presence of serial links, the efficiency loss relative to the social optimum can be arbitrarily large. The reason for this degradation of performance is the double marginalization problem, whereby each serial provider charges high prices not taking into account the effect of this strategy on the profits of other providers along the same path. Nevertheless, when there are no delay costs without transmission (i.e., latencies at zero are equal to zero), irrespective of the number of serial and parallel providers, the efficiency of strong oligopoly equilibria can be bounded by 1/2, where strong oligopoly equilibria are equilibria in which each provider plays a strict best response and all of the traffic is transmitted. However, even with strong oligopoly equilibria, inefficiency can be arbitrarily large when the assumption of no delay costs without transmission is relaxed. View full abstract»

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  • Non-Cooperative Multicast and Facility Location Games

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1193 - 1206
    Cited by:  Papers (6)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (646 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider a multicast game with selfish non- cooperative players. There is a special source node and each player is interested in connecting to the source by making a routing decision that minimizes its payment. The mutual influence of the players is determined by a cost sharing mechanism, which in our case evenly splits the cost of an edge among the players using it. We consider two different models: an integral model, where each player connects to the source by choosing a single path, and a fractional model, where a player is allowed to split the flow it receives from the source between several paths. In both models we explore the overhead incurred in network cost due to the selfish behavior of the users, as well as the computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium. The existence of a Nash equilibrium for the integral model was previously established by the means of a potential function. We prove that finding a Nash equilibrium that minimizes the potential function is NP-hard. We focus on the price of anarchy of a Nash equilibrium resulting from the best-response dynamics of a game course, where the players join the game sequentially. For a game with in players, we establish an upper bound of O(radicnlog2 n) on the price of anarchy, and a lower bound of Omega(log n/log log n). For the fractional model, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium via a potential function and give a polynomial time algorithm for computing an equilibrium that minimizes the potential function. Finally, we consider a weighted extension of the multicast game, and prove that in the fractional model, the game always has a Nash equilibrium. View full abstract»

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  • Multihoming of Users to Access Points in WLANs: A Population Game Perspective

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1207 - 1215
    Cited by:  Papers (31)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (449 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    We consider non-cooperative mobiles, each faced with the problem of which subset of WLANs access points (APs) to connect and multihome to, and how to split its traffic among them. Considering the many users regime, we obtain a potential game model and study its equilibrium. We obtain pricing for which the total throughput is maximized at equilibrium and study the convergence to equilibrium under various evolutionary dynamics. We also study the case where the Internet service provider (ISP) could charge prices greater than that of the cost price mechanism and show that even in this case multihoming is desirable. View full abstract»

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  • Optimal Nonlinear Pricing for a Monopolistic Network Service Provider with Complete and Incomplete Information

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1216 - 1223
    Cited by:  Papers (19)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (217 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    In the communication network pricing literature, it is the linear pricing schemes that have been largely adopted as the means of controlling network usage or generating profits for network service providers. This paper extends the framework to nonlinear pricing and investigates optimal nonlinear pricing policy design for a monopolistic service provider. The problem is formulated as an incentive-design problem, and incentive (pricing) policies are obtained for a many-users regime, which enable the service provider to approach arbitrarily close to Pareto- optimal solutions. Under the assumption that the service provider knows the true user types, analytical and numerical results indicate a profit improvement exceeding 38% over linear pricing by the introduction of nonlinear pricing. We also consider the scenario where the service provider has incomplete information on user types. A comparative study of the results for complete information and incomplete information is carried out as well, with numerical results pointing to 25%-40% loss of profit by the service provider due to incompleteness of information on the user types. View full abstract»

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  • Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1224 - 1236
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (270 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Congestion games are non-cooperative games where the utility of a player from using a certain resource depends on the total number of players that are using the same resource. While most work so far took a distributed game-theoretic approach to this problem, this paper studies centralized solutions for congestion games. The first part of the paper analyzes the problem from a computational perspective. We analyze the computational complexity of the welfare-maximization problem, for which we provide both approximation algorithms and lower bounds. We study this optimization problem under different kinds of congestion effects (externalities) among the players: positive, negative, and unrestricted. Our main algorithmic result is a constant approximation algorithm for congestion games with unrestricted externalities. In the second part of the paper, we also take the strategic behavior of the players into account, and present centralized truthful mechanisms for congestion-game environments. Our main result in this part is an incentive- compatible mechanism for m-resource n-player congestion games that achieves an O(vm log n) approximation to the optimal welfare. We also describe an important and useful connection between congestion games and combinatorial auctions. This connection allows us to use insights and methods from the combinatorial-auction literature for solving congestion-game problems. View full abstract»

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  • VCG-Kelly Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Goods: Adapting VCG Mechanisms to One-Dimensional Signals

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1237 - 1243
    Cited by:  Papers (21)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (382 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    rdquoThe VCG-Kelly mechanism is proposed, which is obtained by composing the communication efficient, one- dimensional signaling idea of Kelly with the VCG mechanism, providing efficient allocation for strategic buyers at Nash equilibrium points. It is shown that the revenue to the seller can be maximized or minimized using a particular one-dimensional family of surrogate valuation functions. View full abstract»

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  • Efficiency of Market-Based Resource Allocation among Many Participants

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1244 - 1259
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (397 KB) |  | HTML iconHTML  

    Market mechanisms have been suggested in the last few years as a tool for allocating shared networks resources among several competing users. In this paper, we consider the efficiency loss of such mechanisms in the presence of a large number of users. We model the user interactions as a game with a heterogeneous population of players characterized by random utility functions. If the utility functions are bounded, then the non-cooperative equilibrium are nearly as efficient as the social optimum with high probability when the number of users is large. This efficiency result holds for a single link with a fixed or an increasing capacity. Using a standard probabilistic analysis, we show that the efficiency loss incurred by the market mechanism decreases almost exponentially in the number of users. If, however, the utility functions are not bounded, then the loss of efficiency does not converge to zero. We also provide results for networks by sampling the users at random based on their paths. View full abstract»

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  • Call for Papers - IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communications - Exploiting Limited Feedback in Tomorrow's Wireless Communication Networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1260
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  • Call for Papers - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications - Broadband Access Networks: Architectures and Protocols

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1261
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  • Call for Papers - IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communications - Underwater Wireless Communications and Networks

    Publication Year: 2007 , Page(s): 1262
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  • Online Tutorials

    Publication Year: 2007
    Save to Project icon | Request Permissions | Click to expandQuick Abstract | PDF file iconPDF (422 KB)  

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  • Information for Authors IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication (J-SAC)

    Publication Year: 2007
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    Provides instructions and guidelines to prospective authors who wish to submit manuscripts. View full abstract»

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Aims & Scope

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications focuses on all telecommunications, including telephone, telegraphy, facsimile, and point-to-point television, by electromagnetic propagation.

Full Aims & Scope

Meet Our Editors

Editor-in-Chief
Muriel Médard
MIT