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IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Issue 5 • Date May 2006

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Displaying Results 1 - 21 of 21
  • Table of contents

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):c1 - c4
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  • IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications publication information

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s): c2
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  • Guest Editorial Price-Based Access Control and Economics of Networking

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):937 - 941
    Cited by:  Papers (1)
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  • Pricing and revenue sharing strategies for Internet service providers

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):942 - 951
    Cited by:  Papers (10)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (432 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    One of the challenges facing the networking industry today is to increase the profitability of Internet services. This calls for economic mechanisms that can enable providers to charge more for better services and collect a fair share of the increased revenues. In this paper, we present a generic pricing model for Internet services jointly offered by a group of providers. We show that noncooperati... View full abstract»

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  • Charge sensitive and incentive compatible end-to-end window-based control for selfish users

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):952 - 961
    Cited by:  Papers (5)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (480 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    This paper considers the problem of finding a tamper-resistant and charge-sensitive end-to-end window flow-control mechanism for greedy users. Using a mathematical model of resource distribution, we propose a distributed window flow-control mechanism leading to a flow-rate vector which achieves maximum total utility. Desirable features of the proposed window control algorithm and properties of the... View full abstract»

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  • Price-based distributed algorithms for rate-reliability tradeoff in network utility maximization

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):962 - 976
    Cited by:  Papers (73)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (624 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    The current framework of network utility maximization for rate allocation and its price-based algorithms assumes that each link provides a fixed-size transmission "pipe" and each user's utility is a function of transmission rate only. These assumptions break down in many practical systems, where, by adapting the physical layer channel coding or transmission diversity, different tradeoffs between r... View full abstract»

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  • Efficiency and Braess' Paradox under pricing in general networks

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):977 - 991
    Cited by:  Papers (6)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (584 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    We study the flow control and routing decisions of self-interested users in a general congested network where a single profit-maximizing service provider sets prices for different paths in the network. We define an equilibrium of the user choices. We then define the monopoly equilibrium (ME) as the equilibrium prices set by the service provider and the corresponding user equilibrium. We analyze th... View full abstract»

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  • A scalable network resource allocation mechanism with bounded efficiency loss

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):992 - 999
    Cited by:  Papers (30)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (296 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    The design of pricing mechanisms for network resource allocation has two important objectives: 1) a simple and scalable end-to-end implementation and 2) efficiency of the resulting equilibria. Both objectives are met by certain recently proposed mechanisms when users are price taking, but not when users can anticipate the effects of their actions on the resulting prices. In this paper, we partiall... View full abstract»

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  • Efficient signal proportional allocation (ESPA) mechanisms: decentralized social welfare maximization for divisible resources

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):1000 - 1009
    Cited by:  Papers (15)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (456 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    We address the problem of devising efficient decentralized allocation mechanisms for a divisible resource, which is critical to many technological domains such as traffic management on the Internet and bandwidth allocation to agents in ad hoc wireless networks. We introduce a class of efficient signal proportional allocation (ESPA) mechanisms that yields an allocation which maximizes social welfar... View full abstract»

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  • Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):1010 - 1019
    Cited by:  Papers (112)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (448 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    We devise a model to study the phenomenon of free-riding and free-identities in peer-to-peer systems. At the heart of our model is a user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user's willingness to contribute resources to the system. A user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current contribution cost in the system compares to her type. We ... View full abstract»

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  • Market sharing games applied to content distribution in ad hoc networks

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):1020 - 1033
    Cited by:  Papers (27)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (520 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    In third-generation (3G) wireless data networks, repeated requests for popular data items can exacerbate the already scarce wireless spectrum. In this paper, we propose an architectural and protocol framework that allows 3G service providers to host efficient content distribution services. We offload the spectrum intensive task of content distribution to an ad hoc network. Less mobile users (resid... View full abstract»

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  • Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):1034 - 1050
    Cited by:  Papers (28)  |  Patents (7)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (496 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    We consider problems of provisioning an excludable public good amongst n potential members of a peer-to-peer system who are able to communicate information about their private preferences for the good. The cost of provisioning the good in quantity Q depends on Q, and may also depend on n, or on the final number of participating peers m. Our aim is to maximize the expected social welfare in a way t... View full abstract»

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  • Smart pay access control via incentive alignment

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):1051 - 1060
    Cited by:  Papers (5)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (424 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    We use game theoretic models to show the lack of incentives in the transport control protocol congestion avoidance algorithm and the consequential system-wide network problems. We then propose a Vickery-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism-based access control mechanism for packet traffic. Our mechanism is called "smart pay access control (SPAC)". We prove both the incentive compatibility and individual r... View full abstract»

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  • Design differentiated service multicast with selfish agents

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):1061 - 1073
    Cited by:  Papers (4)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (573 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the quality-of-service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link e/sub i/ is associated with a (privately known) cost coefficient c/sub i/ such that the cost of e/sub i/ to provide a transmission servi... View full abstract»

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  • Distributed interference compensation for wireless networks

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):1074 - 1084
    Cited by:  Papers (364)  |  Patents (5)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (584 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    We consider a distributed power control scheme for wireless ad hoc networks, in which each user announces a price that reflects compensation paid by other users for their interference. We present an asynchronous distributed algorithm for updating power levels and prices. By relating this algorithm to myopic best response updates in a fictitious game, we are able to characterize convergence using s... View full abstract»

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  • Wireless channel allocation using an auction algorithm

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s):1085 - 1096
    Cited by:  Papers (83)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (424 KB) | HTML iconHTML

    We develop a novel auction-based algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use the second-price auction mechanism whereby user bids for the channel, during each time slot, based on the fade state of the channel, and the user that makes the highest bid wins use of the channel by paying the second highest bid. Under the assumption that each user has a limited budge... View full abstract»

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  • Special issue on cross-layer optimized wireless communications

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s): 1097
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  • Special issue on non-cooperative behavior in networking

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s): 1098
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  • Special issue on optimization of MIMO transceivers for realistic communication networks: Challenges and opportunities

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s): 1099
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  • IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications Information for authors

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s): 1100
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  • IEEE Communications Society Information

    Publication Year: 2006, Page(s): c3
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Aims & Scope

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications focuses on all telecommunications, including telephone, telegraphy, facsimile, and point-to-point television, by electromagnetic propagation.

Full Aims & Scope

Meet Our Editors

Editor-in-Chief
Muriel Médard
MIT