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Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1999. Proceedings of the 12th IEEE

Date 30-30 June 1999

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  • Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop

    Publication Year: 1999
    Request permission for commercial reuse | PDF file iconPDF (138 KB)
    Freely Available from IEEE
  • Index of authors

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s): 239
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    Freely Available from IEEE
  • Authentication via localized names

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):98 - 110
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (236 KB)

    We address the problem of message authentication using the π-calculus, which has been given an operational semantics that provides each sequential process of a system with its own local space of names. We exploit here that semantics and its localized names to guarantee by construction that a message has been generated by a given entity. Therefore, our proposal can be seen as a reference for the... View full abstract»

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  • Formalization and proof of secrecy properties

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):92 - 95
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (36 KB)

    After looking at the security literature, you will find secrecy is formalized in different ways, depending on the application. Applications have threat models that influence our choice of secrecy properties. A property may be reasonable in one context and completely unsatisfactory in another if other threats exist. The primary goal of this paper is to foster discussion on what sorts of secrecy pro... View full abstract»

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  • CVS: a compiler for the analysis of cryptographic protocols

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):203 - 212
    Cited by:  Papers (10)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (96 KB)

    The Security Process Algebra (SPA) is a CCS-like specification language where actions belong to two different levels of confidentiality. It has been used to define several non-interference-like security properties whose verification has been automatized by means of the tool CoSeC. In recent years, a method for analyzing security protocols using SPA and CoSeC has been developed. Even if it has been... View full abstract»

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  • Honest functions and their application to the analysis of cryptographic protocols

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):83 - 89
    Cited by:  Papers (4)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (140 KB)

    J.D. Guttman, et al. (1998) have introduced “strand spaces” as a technique for describing and analyzing cryptographic protocols (i.e. schemes for exchanging messages between legitimate agents in a communications system for purposes of authentication or establishing session keys). The strands of such a protocol are directly mapped to traces of the messages which are transmitted and rece... View full abstract»

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  • Athena: a new efficient automatic checker for security protocol analysis

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):192 - 202
    Cited by:  Papers (40)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (212 KB)

    We propose an efficient automatic checking algorithm, Athena, for analyzing security protocols. Athena incorporates a logic that can express security properties including authentication, secrecy and properties related to electronic commerce. We have developed an automatic procedure for evaluating well-formed formulae in this logic. For a well-formed formula, if the evaluation procedure terminates,... View full abstract»

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  • Decision procedures for the analysis of cryptographic protocols by logics of belief

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):44 - 54
    Cited by:  Papers (2)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (192 KB)

    Belief-logic deductions are used in the analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show a new method to decide such logics. In addition to the familiar BAN logic, it is also applicable to the more advanced versions of protocol security logics, and GNY in particular; and it employs an efficient forward-chaining algorithm the completeness and termination of which are proved. Theoretic proofs, implement... View full abstract»

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  • Mixed strand spaces

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):72 - 82
    Cited by:  Papers (12)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (176 KB)

    Strand space analysis is a method for stating and proving correctness properties for cryptographic protocols. In this paper we apply the same method to the related problem of mixed protocols, and show that a protocol can remain correct even when used in combination with a range of other protocols. We illustrate the method with the familiar Otway-Rees protocol. We identify a simple and easily verif... View full abstract»

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  • A logical framework for reasoning on data access control policies

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):175 - 189
    Cited by:  Papers (13)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (264 KB)

    We propose a logic formalism that naturally supports the encoding of complex security specifications. This formalism relies on a hierarchically structured domain made of subjects, objects and privileges. Authorizations are expressed by logic rules. The formalism supports both negation by failure (possibly unstratified) and true negation. The latter is used to express negative authorizations. It tu... View full abstract»

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  • Safe simplifying transformations for security protocols or not just the Needham Schroeder pubic key protocol

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):32 - 43
    Cited by:  Papers (1)  |  Patents (1)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (168 KB)

    Recent techniques for analyzing security protocols have tended to concentrate upon the small protocols that are typically found in the academic literature. However there is a huge gulf between these and most large commercial protocols: the latter typically have many more fields, and much higher levels of nested encryption. As a result, existing techniques are difficult to apply directly to these l... View full abstract»

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  • A logic for SDSI's linked local name spaces: preliminary version

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):111 - 122
    Cited by:  Papers (9)  |  Patents (2)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (196 KB)

    M. Abadi (1998) has introduced a logic to explicate the meaning of local names in SDSI, the simple distributed security infrastructure proposed by Rivest and Lampson. Abadi's logic does not correspond precisely to SDSI, however, it draws conclusions about local names that do not follow from SDSI's name resolution algorithm. Moreover its semantics is somewhat unintuitive. This paper presents the lo... View full abstract»

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  • Process algebra and non-interference

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):214 - 227
    Cited by:  Papers (31)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (172 KB)

    The information security community has long debated the exact definition of the term “security”. Even if we focus on the more modest notion of confidentiality the precise definition remains controversial. In their seminal paper, Goguen and Meseguer (1982) took an important step towards a formalisation of the notion of absence of information flow with the concept of non-interference. Th... View full abstract»

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  • A meta-notation for protocol analysis

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):55 - 69
    Cited by:  Papers (37)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (232 KB)

    Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the “Dolev-Yao model”. In this paper, we use a multiset rewriting formalism, based on linear logic, to state the basic assumptions of this model. A characteristic of our formalism is the way that existential quantification provides a succinct way of choosing new values, such a... View full abstract»

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  • Trusted system construction

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):124 - 135
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (96 KB)

    Any system constructed today is likely to be constructed from COTS components. Encapsulation of these components using software wrappers promises to enable trusted systems to be constructed. These systems are complex and it is difficult to impose security without compromising operational effectiveness. The key problem which this paper addresses is to analyse encapsulations of COTS components to de... View full abstract»

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  • What is intransitive noninterference?

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):228 - 238
    Cited by:  Papers (33)  |  Patents (4)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (148 KB)

    The term “intransitive noninterference” refers to the information flow properties required of systems like downgraders, in which it may be legitimate for information to flow indirectly, between two users but not directly. We examine the usual definition of this property in terms of a modified purge function, and show that this is a distinctly weaker property than an alternative we deri... View full abstract»

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  • Secure composition of insecure components

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):136 - 150
    Cited by:  Papers (9)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (272 KB)

    Software systems are becoming heterogeneous: instead of a small number of large programs from well-established sources, a user's desktop may now consist of many smaller components that interact in intricate ways. Some components will be down-loaded from the network from sources that are only partially trusted. A user would like to know that a number of security properties hold, e.g., that personal... View full abstract»

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  • Security function interactions

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):151 - 160
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (148 KB)

    We use a compositional framework to model security architectures involving heterogeneous and distributed security functions. Our goal is to assist the ITSEC evaluation of suitability binding and vulnerability of a set of security functions. We propose constraints that security functions should guarantee in order to interact consistently, and securely with other functions. To illustrate these notio... View full abstract»

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  • A logic-based knowledge representation for authorization with delegation

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):162 - 174
    Cited by:  Papers (9)  |  Patents (3)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (188 KB)

    We introduce Delegation Logic (DL), a logic-based knowledge representation (i.e., language) that deals with authorization in large-scale, open distributed systems. Of central importance in any system for deciding whether requests should be authorized in such a system are delegation of authority, negation of authority, and conflicts between authorities. DL's approach to these issues and to the inte... View full abstract»

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  • A formal framework and evaluation method for network denial of service

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):4 - 13
    Cited by:  Papers (51)  |  Patents (1)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (140 KB)

    Denial of service is becoming a growing concern. As our systems communicate more and more with others that we know less and less, they become increasingly vulnerable to hostile intruders who may take advantage of the very protocols intended for the establishment and authentication of communication to tie up our resources and disable our servers. Since these attacks occur before parties are authent... View full abstract»

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  • I/O automaton models and proofs for shared-key communication systems

    Publication Year: 1999, Page(s):14 - 29
    Cited by:  Papers (9)
    Request permission for commercial reuse | Click to expandAbstract | PDF file iconPDF (268 KB)

    The combination of two security protocols, a simple shared-key communication protocol and the Diffie-Hellman key distribution protocol, is modeled formally and proved correct. The modeling is based on the I/O automaton model for distributed algorithms, and the proofs are based on invariant assertions, simulation relations, and compositional reasoning. Arguments about the cryptosystems are handled ... View full abstract»

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