Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics
Arcaute, E.
Johari, R.
Mannor, S.
Inst. for Comput. & Math. Eng., Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA, USA;
This paper appears in: Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on
Publication Date: Aug. 2009
Volume: 54,
Issue: 8
On page(s): 1765-1778
ISSN: 0018-9286
INSPEC Accession Number: 10806014
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/TAC.2009.2024564
First Published: 2009-07-24
Current Version Published: 2009-08-04
Abstract
We consider a network formation game where nodes wish to send traffic to each other. Nodes contract bilaterally with each other to form bidirectional communication links; once the network is formed, traffic is routed along shortest paths (if possible). Cost is incurred to a node from four sources: 1) routing traffic; 2) maintaining links to other nodes; 3) disconnection from destinations the node wishes to reach; and 4) payments made to other nodes. We assume that a network is stable if no single node wishes to unilaterally deviate, and no pair of nodes can profitably deviate together (a variation on the notion of pairwise stability). We study such a game under a form of myopicbestresponsedynamics. In choosing their action, nodes optimize their single period payoff only. We characterize a simple set of assumptions under which these dynamics converge to a stable network; we also characterize an important special case, where the dynamics converge to a star centered at a node with minimum cost for routing traffic. In this sense, our dynamics naturally select an efficient equilibrium.
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