Base Station Association Game in Multi-Cell Wireless Networks (Special Paper)
Libin Jiang
Parekh, S.
Walrand, J.
Univ. of California, Berkeley;
This paper appears in: Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, 2008. WCNC 2008. IEEE
Publication Date: March 31 2008-April 3 2008
On page(s): 1616-1621
Location: Las Vegas, NV,
ISSN: 1525-3511
ISBN: 978-1-4244-1997-5
INSPEC Accession Number: 9925482
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/WCNC.2008.289
Current Version Published: 2008-04-15
Abstract
We consider a multi-cell wireless network with a large number of users. Each user selfishly chooses the Base Station (BS) that gives it the best throughput (utility), and each BS allocates its resource by some simple scheduling policy. First we consider two cases: (1) BS allocates the same time to its users; (2) BS allocates the same throughput to its users. It turns out that, combined with users' selfish behavior, case (1) results in a single Nash Equilibrium (NE), which achieves system-wide Proportional Fairness. On the other hand, case (2) results in many possible Nash Equilibria, some of which are very inefficient. Next, we extend (1) to the case where the users have general concave utility functions. It is shown that the if each BS performs intra- cell optimization, the total utility of all users is maximized at NE. This suggests that under our model, the task of joining the ";correct"; BS can be left to individual users, leading to a distributed solution.
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