A cryptographically sound security proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol
Backes, M.
Pfitzmann, B.
IBM Zurich Res. Lab., Rueschlikon, Switzerland;
This paper appears in: Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on
Publication Date: Dec. 2004
Volume: 22,
Issue: 10
On page(s): 2075- 2086
ISSN: 0733-8716
INSPEC Accession Number: 8207687
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/JSAC.2004.836016
Current Version Published: 2004-11-30
Abstract
We present a cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol for entity authentication. This protocol was previously only proved over unfounded abstractions from cryptography. We show that it is secure against arbitrary active attacks if it is implemented using standard provably secure cryptographic primitives. Nevertheless, our proof does not have to deal with the probabilistic aspects of cryptography and is, hence, in the scope of current automated proof tools. We achieve this by exploiting a recently proposed Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library with a provably secure cryptographic implementation. Besides establishing the cryptographic security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, our result exemplifies the potential of this cryptographic library and paves the way for the cryptographically sound verification of security protocols by automated proof tools.
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