Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Murφ
Mitchell, J.C.
Mitchell, M.
Stern, U.
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Stanford Univ., CA;
This paper appears in: Security and Privacy, 1997. Proceedings., 1997 IEEE Symposium on
Publication Date: 4-7 May 1997
On page(s): 141-151
Meeting Date: 05/04/1997 - 05/07/1997
Location: Oakland, CA, USA
ISBN: 0-8186-7828-3
References Cited: 19
INSPEC Accession Number: 5602920
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/SECPRI.1997.601329
Current Version Published: 2002-08-06
Abstract
A methodology is presented for using a general-purpose state
enumeration tool, Murφ, to analyze cryptographic and
security-related protocols. We illustrate the feasibility of the
approach by analyzing the Needham-Schroeder (1978) protocol, finding a
known bug in a few seconds of computation time, and analyzing variants
of Kerberos and the faulty TMN protocol used in another comparative
study. The efficiency of Murφ also allows us to examine multiple
terms of relatively short protocols, giving us the ability to detect
replay attacks, or errors resulting from confusion between independent
execution of a protocol by independent parties
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