Local dynamics for network formation games
Arcaute, E.
Johari, R.
Mannor, S.
Inst. for Comput. & Math. Eng., Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA;
This paper appears in: Communication, Control, and Computing, 2008 46th Annual Allerton Conference on
Publication Date: 23-26 Sept. 2008
On page(s): 937-938
Location: Urbana-Champaign, IL,
ISBN: 978-1-4244-2925-7
INSPEC Accession Number: 10501158
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797658
Current Version Published: 2009-03-04
Abstract
Network formation games capture two conflicting objectives of self-interested nodes in a network. On one hand, such a node wishes to be able to reach all other nodes in the network; on the other hand, it wishes to minimize its cost of participation. We focus on myopic dynamics in a class of such games inspired by transportation and communication models. A key property of the dynamics we study is that they are local: nodes can only deviate to form links with others in a restricted neighborhood. Despite this locality, we find that our dynamics converge to efficient or nearly efficient outcomes in a range of settings of interest.
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