Securing User-Controlled Routing Infrastructures
Lakshminarayanan, K.
Adkins, D.
Perrig, A.
Stoica, I.
Dept. of Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci., California Univ., Berkeley, CA;
This paper appears in: Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Publication Date: June 2008
Volume: 16,
Issue: 3
On page(s): 549-561
Location: San Francisco, CA, USA,
ISSN: 1063-6692
INSPEC Accession Number: 10058921
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/TNET.2007.903980
Current Version Published: 2008-06-13
Abstract
Designing infrastructures that give untrusted third parties (such as end-hosts) control over routing is a promising research direction for achieving flexible and efficient communication. However, serious concerns remain over the deployment of such infrastructures, particularly the new security vulnerabilities they introduce. The flexible control plane of these infrastructures can be exploited to launch many types of powerful attacks with little effort. In this paper, we make several contributions towards studying security issues in forwarding infrastructures (FIs). We present a general model for an FI, analyze potential security vulnerabilities, and present techniques to address these vulnerabilities. The main technique that we introduce in this paper is the use of simple lightweight cryptographic constraints on forwarding entries. We show that it is possible to prevent a large class of attacks on end-hosts and bound the flooding attacks that can be launched on the infrastructure nodes to a small constant value. Our mechanisms are general and apply to a variety of earlier proposals such as , DataRouter, and Network Pointers.
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